Evolutionary Stable Strategies

Evolutionary Stable Strategies is a game-theoretic concept in evolutionary biology that refers to a strategy which, if adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare due to natural selection favoring the original strategy.

549

Publications

33.4K

Citations

1.2K

Authors

568

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

187

Variants

Ess

Authors

1.2K

  1. WG
    W. G. S. Hines

    University of Guelph, Canada

    14 publications · 386 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. HT
    Hamidou Tembiné

    Supélec, France

    9 publications · 189 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. RE
    Rachid El-Azouzi

    Université d'Avignon et des Pays de Vaucluse, France

    9 publications · 198 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. JS
    Joel S. Brown

    University of Illinois Chicago, United States

    8 publications · 610 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. YH
    Yézékaël Hayel

    Université d'Avignon et des Pays de Vaucluse, France

    7 publications · 144 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 1.2K

Venues

  1. Journal of Theoretical Biology

    41 publications · 4.1K citations

    28

    h-index

  2. The American Naturalist

    AN · 18 publications · 1.9K citations

    17

    h-index

  3. Sustainability

    20 publications · 585 citations

    15

    h-index

  4. 14

    h-index

  5. Journal of Applied Probability

    JAP · 16 publications · 557 citations

    14

    h-index

1–5