Evolutionary Repeated Games

Evolutionary Repeated Games is a theoretical framework in game theory that models the dynamic adaptation of strategies in repeated interactions through evolutionary mechanisms such as selection, mutation, and imitation, distinguishing it from classical repeated games by emphasizing population-level strategy evolution over individual rational optimization.

34

Publications

2.6K

Citations

70

Authors

65

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Authors

70

  1. MA
    Martin A. Nowak

    Harvard University, United States

    4 publications · 499 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. KS
    Karl Sigmund

    University of Vienna, Austria

    3 publications · 388 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. MC
    Ming Cao

    University of Groningen, Netherlands

    2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MC
    Maarten C. Boerlijst

    University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

    2 publications · 75 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LL
    Linjie Liu

    Northwest A&F University, China

    2 publications · 68 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 70

Venues

  1. Journal of Theoretical Biology

    3 publications · 169 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

    PNAS · 3 publications · 508 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

    2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 549 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation

    2 publications · 91 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5