Evolutionary Repeated Games
Evolutionary Repeated Games is a theoretical framework in game theory that models the dynamic adaptation of strategies in repeated interactions through evolutionary mechanisms such as selection, mutation, and imitation, distinguishing it from classical repeated games by emphasizing population-level strategy evolution over individual rational optimization.
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2.6K
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70
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65
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2017–2026
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Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
George J. Mailath · Journal of Economic Theory · 1992 · 179 citations · Full text
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University of Groningen
Groningen, The Netherlands
2 h-index
4 publications
206 citations
Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique
Le Chesnay-Rocquencourt, France
2 h-index
2 publications
26 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
2 h-index
3 publications
123 citations
Lancaster University
Lancaster, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
288 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
430 citations
University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria
2 h-index
2 publications
350 citations
Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Lisbon, Portugal
2 h-index
2 publications
288 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
198 citations
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3 publications · 169 citations
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PNAS · 3 publications · 508 citations
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2 publications · 103 citations
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JET · 2 publications · 549 citations
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2 publications · 91 citations
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