Epistemic Variance is a theoretical construct within epistemology that denotes the extent to which standards of knowledge justification vary across different epistemic frameworks or communities, thereby distinguishing it from invariantist conceptions of knowledge by emphasizing the contextual relativity of truth and rational acceptability.
6
Publications
193
Citations
9
Authors
8
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Parents
Publications
6
The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism
Tyler Cowen · Utilitas · 2006 · 21 citations
Business, Economics, Decision Theory +15
1–5 of 6
Authors
9
- RD
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- MD
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- DC
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- WL
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- MA
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1–5 of 9
Institutions
8
City University of New York
New York, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations
The Graduate Center, CUNY
New York, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
33 citations
American University
Washington, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
100 citations
George Mason University
Fairfax, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
University of St Andrews
St Andrews, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
36 citations
University of Stirling
Stirling, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
36 citations
University of Massachusetts Lowell
Lowell, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
50 citations
Washington University in St. Louis
St Louis, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
36 citations
1–8 of 8
Venues
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1 publications · 36 citations
1
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- American Political Science Review
1 publications · 50 citations
1
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- Mind & Language
1 publications · 33 citations
1
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- Utilitas
1 publications · 21 citations
1
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- Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
1 publications · 36 citations
1
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1–5