Entry Deterrence Pricing is a strategic pricing practice within competition-based pricing whereby an incumbent firm sets prices below the profit-maximizing level to discourage potential entrants from entering the market by making it appear less profitable or risky.
27
Publications
2.7K
Citations
38
Authors
18
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Variants
Limit Pricing
Parents
Publications
27
Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing
A. Michael Spence · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1977 · 1.2K citations
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · Journal of Industrial Economics · 2000 · 217 citations
1–5 of 27
Authors
38
- SM
1
h-index
- HW
1
h-index
- RP
1
h-index
- MB
1
h-index
- DS
1
h-index
1–5 of 38
Institutions
18
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
63 citations
Université Fédérale de Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées
Toulouse, France
1 h-index
1 publications
217 citations
Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics
Pune, India
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
University of Siegen
Siegen, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
22 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
217 citations
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
12 citations
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Rome, Italy
1 h-index
1 publications
13 citations
1–8 of 18
Venues
- The RAND Journal of Economics
3 publications · 213 citations
3
h-index
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
3 publications · 49 citations
3
h-index
- The Bell Journal of Economics
3 publications · 1.4K citations
3
h-index
- Journal of Economics
2 publications · 30 citations
2
h-index
- Southern Economic Journal
2 publications · 29 citations
2
h-index
1–5