Endogenous Exit

Endogenous Exit is a theoretical construct in game theory that models the decision to withdraw from a conflict as a strategic choice determined internally by the optimizing behavior of rational agents, rather than imposed by external forces or predetermined rules.

85

Publications

4.6K

Citations

143

Authors

110

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

143

  1. PW
    Paul W. Miller

    The University of Western Australia, Australia

    2 publications · 62 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SD
    Sam Dinkin

    University of Arizona, United States

    2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RC
    Russell Cooper

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    2 publications · 158 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JT
    J. Todd Swarthout

    Georgia State University, United States

    2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JM
    Josep M. Colomer

    Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain

    2 publications · 60 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 143

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 124 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 145 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Journal of Comparative Economics

    3 publications · 266 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Journal of Development Economics

    3 publications · 140 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

    2 publications · 59 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5