Endogenous Exit
Endogenous Exit is a theoretical construct in game theory that models the decision to withdraw from a conflict as a strategic choice determined internally by the optimizing behavior of rational agents, rather than imposed by external forces or predetermined rules.
85
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4.6K
Citations
143
Authors
110
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
9
Parents
85
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · Econometrica · 1986 · 325 citations
Social Sciences, Economics, Strategy +14
The Generalized War of Attrition
Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer · American Economic Review · 1999 · 233 citations
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110

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
272 citations
Georgetown University
Washington, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
299 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
3 h-index
3 publications
78 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
90 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
308 citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
140 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
32 citations

Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
86 citations
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Repository · 5 publications · 124 citations
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Repository · 3 publications · 145 citations
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3 publications · 266 citations
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3 publications · 140 citations
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2 publications · 59 citations
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