Efficient Wage Contracts

Efficient Wage Contracts is a theoretical framework in principal-agent theory that specifies wage arrangements designed to align an agent’s incentives with the principal’s objectives under hidden action by compensating the agent at a level that elicits optimal effort while minimizing incentive costs.

133

Publications

15.2K

Citations

180

Authors

120

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

180

  1. JA
    Johannes Abeler

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 202 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. YZ
    Yves Zénou

    Stockholm University, Sweden

    3 publications · 43 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SK
    Sebastian Kube

    University of Bonn, Germany

    3 publications · 202 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. AJ
    Andrew J. Oswald

    University of Warwick, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 228 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. MW
    Matthias Wibral

    University of Bonn, Germany

    3 publications · 202 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 180

Venues

  1. Economics Letters

    12 publications · 277 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 202 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 6 publications · 136 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. The Economic Journal

    6 publications · 407 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. Journal of Labor Economics

    JOLE · 5 publications · 233 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5