Efficient Wage Contracts
Efficient Wage Contracts is a theoretical framework in principal-agent theory that specifies wage arrangements designed to align an agent’s incentives with the principal’s objectives under hidden action by compensating the agent at a level that elicits optimal effort while minimizing incentive costs.
133
Publications
15.2K
Citations
180
Authors
120
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
4
Parents
133
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
William P. Rogerson · Econometrica · 1985 · 885 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +17
George P. Baker, Michael Gibbs, Bengt Holmström · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1994 · 648 citations
Jonathan Thomas, Tim Worrall · The Review of Economic Studies · 1988 · 456 citations
1–5 of 133
180
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
1–5 of 180
120
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
9 h-index
14 publications
5.2K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
4 h-index
4 publications
127 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
4 h-index
4 publications
561 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
909 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
3 h-index
4 publications
96 citations
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Stockholm, Sweden
3 h-index
4 publications
609 citations

Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden
3 h-index
4 publications
261 citations
University of Bonn
Bonn, Germany
3 h-index
7 publications
470 citations
1–8 of 120
12 publications · 277 citations
12
h-index
Repository · 8 publications · 202 citations
8
h-index
Repository · 6 publications · 136 citations
6
h-index
6 publications · 407 citations
6
h-index
JOLE · 5 publications · 233 citations
5
h-index
1–5