Efficient Allocation Rules
Efficient Allocation Rules is a theoretical framework in auction theory that prescribes the allocation of goods or resources among bidders in a way that maximizes total social welfare by assigning items to those who value them most, distinguishing it from alternative allocation mechanisms that may prioritize revenue, fairness, or simplicity over allocative efficiency.
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13.8K
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424
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249
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2017–2026
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207
Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules
Tze-Leung Lai, Herbert Robbins · Advances in Applied Mathematics · 1985 · 2.5K citations
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
Szilvia Pápai · Econometrica · 2000 · 369 citations
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science
Michael Strevens · The Journal of Philosophy · 2003 · 343 citations
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Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
8 h-index
14 publications
718 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
7 h-index
11 publications
5.3K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
6 h-index
14 publications
751 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
6 h-index
14 publications
947 citations

University of Glasgow
Glasgow, United Kingdom
5 h-index
7 publications
98 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
5 h-index
10 publications
939 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
9 publications
242 citations
New York University
New York, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
283 citations
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Repository · 17 publications · 464 citations
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8 publications · 256 citations
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Repository · 7 publications · 302 citations
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4 publications · 222 citations
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4 publications · 665 citations
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