Efficient Allocation Rules

Efficient Allocation Rules is a theoretical framework in auction theory that prescribes the allocation of goods or resources among bidders in a way that maximizes total social welfare by assigning items to those who value them most, distinguishing it from alternative allocation mechanisms that may prioritize revenue, fairness, or simplicity over allocative efficiency.

207

Publications

13.8K

Citations

424

Authors

249

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

36

Authors

424

  1. YC
    Yeon‐Koo Che

    Columbia University, United States

    4 publications · 234 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. SS
    Shigehiro Serizawa

    Osaka University of Economics, Japan

    3 publications · 124 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. CB
    Clas Bergström

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    3 publications · 77 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JW
    Jean Walrand

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    2 publications · 492 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. TR
    Tim Roughgarden

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 64 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 424

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 17 publications · 464 citations

    14

    h-index

  2. Social Choice and Welfare

    8 publications · 256 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 7 publications · 302 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. Journal of Public Economic Theory

    4 publications · 222 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    4 publications · 665 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5