Efficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions is a theoretical construct in auction theory that characterizes the extent to which the allocation of multiple identical or heterogeneous items maximizes total social surplus by assigning each unit to the bidders who value them most highly, subject to the constraints of indivisibility and competitive bidding dynamics.
43
Publications
4.3K
Citations
78
Authors
69
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
5
Parents
Publications
43
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Larry Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia et al. · The Review of Economic Studies · 2014 · 707 citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +15
An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
Lawrence M. Ausubel · American Economic Review · 2006 · 284 citations
1–5 of 43
Authors
78
- MG
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3
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- AM
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1–5 of 78
Institutions
69
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
1.9K citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
242 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
1.5K citations
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 h-index
2 publications
37 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
1.4K citations
San Francisco State University
San Francisco, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
44 citations
The Ohio State University
Columbus, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
44 citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
2 h-index
6 publications
452 citations
1–8 of 69
Venues
- The Review of Economic Studies
5 publications · 1.1K citations
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 4 publications · 59 citations
4
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- Games and Economic Behavior
4 publications · 162 citations
4
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- American Economic Review
4 publications · 659 citations
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- The RAND Journal of Economics
2 publications · 91 citations
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