Efficiency in Entry-Deterring Auctions is an economic framework that analyzes how auction mechanisms can achieve allocative efficiency while strategically deterring potential bidders from entering the market by leveraging informational asymmetries or structural design features.
2
Publications
26
Citations
3
Authors
6
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
0
Parents
Publications
2
Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer · American Economic Review · 2009 · 16 citations · Full text
1–2 of 2
Authors
3
- AM
1
h-index
- PK
1
h-index
- JB
1
h-index
1–3 of 3
Institutions
6
Boston University
Boston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
10 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations
Bay State College
Boston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
10 citations
1–6 of 6
Venues
- American Economic Review
1 publications · 16 citations
1
h-index
- Mathematical Social Sciences
1 publications · 10 citations
1
h-index
1–2