Dynamic Incentive Constraints

Dynamic Incentive Constraints is a theoretical construct in repeated games that captures the intertemporal restrictions on players' strategy choices arising from the need to sustain equilibrium behavior over time through contingent rewards and punishments.

24

Publications

1.2K

Citations

67

Authors

50

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Authors

67

  1. CR
    Christian Riis Flor

    University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. KR
    Kristian R. Miltersen

    Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. DL
    David Lando

    Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MZ
    Mingliang Zhou

    Chongqing University, China

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. ZL
    Zhenning Li

    University of Macau, Macao SAR China

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 67

Venues

  1. International Economic Review

    2 publications · 69 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 139 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Corporate Finance

    1 publications · 54 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. 1

    h-index

  5. IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy

    TSTE · 1 publications · 111 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5