Dynamic Commitment

Dynamic Commitment is a theoretical construct in the study of strategic interaction within the War of Attrition framework that characterizes a player's ability to credibly signal and maintain a continuously adjustable threshold of persistence over time, thereby influencing opponents' expectations and decisions through endogenously evolving stakes.

15

Publications

1.1K

Citations

25

Authors

19

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

25

  1. PP
    Per Pettersson‐Lidbom

    Stockholm University, Sweden

    2 publications · 143 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. PZ
    Pavel Zryumov

    University of Rochester, United States

    2 publications · 100 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. DO
    Dmitry Orlov

    University of Rochester, United States

    2 publications · 100 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. LS
    Laura Schechter

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    2 publications · 99 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. AS
    Andrzej Skrzypacz

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 100 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 25

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 67 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. 1

    h-index

  3. Journal of Risk & Insurance

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

    1 publications · 30 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 1 publications · 89 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5