Dynamic Commitment
Dynamic Commitment is a theoretical construct in the study of strategic interaction within the War of Attrition framework that characterizes a player's ability to credibly signal and maintain a continuously adjustable threshold of persistence over time, thereby influencing opponents' expectations and decisions through endogenously evolving stakes.
15
Publications
1.1K
Citations
25
Authors
19
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Parents
15
Persuading the Principal to Wait
Dmitry Orlov, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Pavel Zryumov · Journal of Political Economy · 2019 · 89 citations
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University of Wisconsin–Madison
Madison, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
199 citations

University of Rochester
Rochester, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
100 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
100 citations

Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden
2 h-index
2 publications
143 citations
Minnesota Department of Education
Roseville, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
50 citations
Federal Reserve
Washington D.C., United States
1 h-index
1 publications
13 citations
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore
1 h-index
1 publications
30 citations
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
189 citations
1–8 of 19
Repository · 3 publications · 67 citations
3
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Repository · 1 publications · 35 citations
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1 publications · 14 citations
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1 publications · 30 citations
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JPE · 1 publications · 89 citations
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