Dynamic Auction Collusion
Dynamic Auction Collusion is a form of strategic coordination among bidders in sequential or repeated auction environments wherein participants adapt their bidding behaviors over time to suppress competition and maximize collective payoffs, distinguished from static collusion by its reliance on intertemporal cooperation, information exchange, and punishment mechanisms across multiple rounds.
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11
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2017–2026
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A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power
Christopher M. Snyder · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1996 · 260 citations
Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions
Nicolas Fugger, Elena Katok, Achim Wambach · Management Science · 2015 · 62 citations
Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions
Anthony M. Kwasnica, Katerina Sherstyuk · The Economic Journal · 2007 · 57 citations
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Xia Zhou, Hai-Tao Zheng · 2010 · 41 citations
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Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
143 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
1 h-index
3 publications
99 citations

University of Cologne
Cologne, Germany
1 h-index
2 publications
124 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
25 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
20 citations

University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada
1 h-index
1 publications
43 citations
The University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
62 citations
Dartmouth College
Hanover, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
20 citations
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IJEB · 1 publications · 25 citations
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1 publications · 62 citations
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1 publications · 57 citations
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1 publications · 260 citations
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1 publications · 43 citations
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