Dynamic Auction Collusion

Dynamic Auction Collusion is a form of strategic coordination among bidders in sequential or repeated auction environments wherein participants adapt their bidding behaviors over time to suppress competition and maximize collective payoffs, distinguished from static collusion by its reliance on intertemporal cooperation, information exchange, and punishment mechanisms across multiple rounds.

8

Publications

541

Citations

16

Authors

11

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

16

  1. CM
    Christopher M. Snyder

    Dartmouth College, United States

    2 publications · 280 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. KS
    Katerina Sherstyuk

    University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, United States

    1 publications · 57 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. SS
    Shabnam Sodagari

    Virginia Tech, United States

    1 publications · 43 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. YV
    Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

    Vanderbilt University, United States

    1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. DM
    Daniel M. Reeves

    University of Michigan, United States

    1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 16

Venues

  1. International Journal of Electronic Business

    IJEB · 1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    1 publications · 62 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. The Economic Journal

    1 publications · 57 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. The RAND Journal of Economics

    1 publications · 260 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. 1

    h-index

1–5