Contractual Self-enforcement
Contractual Self-Enforcement is a governance mechanism in transaction cost economics wherein the continuity of a relational exchange is sustained endogenously through the internal incentives of the parties to uphold their commitments, without reliance on external legal enforcement.
36
Publications
4K
Citations
60
Authors
58
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Parents
36
Relational Incentive Contracts
Jonathan Levin · American Economic Review · 2003 · 1.1K citations
The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts
Clive Bull · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1987 · 677 citations
Jonathan Thomas, Tim Worrall · The Review of Economic Studies · 1988 · 456 citations
A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law
Bernard S. Black, Reinier Kraakman · Harvard Law Review · 1996 · 233 citations
1–5 of 36
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Peterson Institute for International Economics, United States
2 publications · 28 citations
2
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1–5 of 60
58
New York University
New York, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
825 citations

Brandeis University
Waltham, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
46 citations

University of Milano-Bicocca
Milan, Italy
2 h-index
2 publications
30 citations
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
2 h-index
3 publications
267 citations

Washington University in St. Louis
St Louis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
106 citations
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Canada
2 h-index
4 publications
90 citations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
230 citations
Compass (United States)
New York, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
69 citations
1–8 of 58
Repository · 6 publications · 191 citations
6
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JB · 2 publications · 226 citations
2
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2 publications · 230 citations
2
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2 publications · 65 citations
2
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1 publications · 90 citations
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