Constitutional Choice

Constitutional Choice is a theoretical framework in social choice theory that specifies the rules and procedures by which individual preferences are aggregated into collective decisions, distinguished by its focus on the foundational design of voting systems and collective decision-making mechanisms under constitutional constraints.

135

Publications

11.7K

Citations

163

Authors

103

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

10

Authors

163

  1. JM
    James M. Buchanan

    George Mason University, United States

    3 publications · 251 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. DC
    Dennis C. Mueller

    University of Vienna, Austria

    3 publications · 259 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. AC
    Alex Cukierman

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    2 publications · 242 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. LI
    Louis Imbeau

    Université du Québec en Abitibi-Témiscamingue, Canada

    2 publications · 21 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. GV
    Georg Vanberg

    Duke University, United States

    2 publications · 63 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 163

Venues

  1. Constitutional Political Economy

    CPE · 8 publications · 218 citations

    9

    h-index

  2. American Political Science Review

    6 publications · 664 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. Choice Reviews Online

    CRO · 5 publications · 213 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. Public Choice

    5 publications · 197 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 91 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5