Complete Information Games

Complete Information Games is a type of normal-form game in which each player’s payoff function is common knowledge among all players, distinguishing it from games with incomplete or asymmetric information.

149

Publications

12.3K

Citations

227

Authors

139

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

10

Authors

227

  1. GB
    Giacomo Bonanno

    University of California, Davis, United States

    4 publications · 65 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. MP
    Michael P. Wellman

    University of Michigan, United States

    4 publications · 101 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. DB
    Dirk Bergemann

    Yale University, United States

    4 publications · 65 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. SM
    Stephen Morris

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 77 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. DS
    Dov Samet

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    3 publications · 196 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 227

Venues

  1. International Journal of Game Theory

    13 publications · 665 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    11 publications · 536 citations

    11

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 10 publications · 179 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    8 publications · 2.2K citations

    8

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 7 publications · 373 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5