Communication Equilibrium is a theoretical framework in information economics that characterizes the stable state in which strategic agents optimally balance the disclosure and withholding of private information, given asymmetric knowledge and incentives to influence each other’s beliefs and actions.
127
Publications
14.5K
Citations
218
Authors
131
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
19
Parents
Publications
127
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations
Multistage Games with Communication
Roger B. Myerson · Econometrica · 1986 · 608 citations
1–5 of 127
Authors
218
- FS
5
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- FF
5
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- AB
4
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- GA
4
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- AB
3
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1–5 of 218
Institutions
131
Columbia University
New York, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
416 citations
University of California San Diego
San Diego, United States
6 h-index
7 publications
775 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
5 h-index
6 publications
853 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
157 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
4 h-index
8 publications
1.1K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
306 citations
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Norway
3 h-index
5 publications
135 citations
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
3 h-index
4 publications
129 citations
1–8 of 131
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 16 publications · 312 citations
11
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 7 publications · 1.1K citations
7
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- Games and Economic Behavior
6 publications · 237 citations
6
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- Econometrica
6 publications · 5.7K citations
6
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- Journal of Communication
4 publications · 309 citations
4
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