Communication Equilibria

Communication Equilibria is a solution concept in game theory within information economics that extends Bayesian Nash equilibrium by allowing players to exchange messages through a communication device, thereby inducing correlated strategies that are stable under unilateral deviations and refine equilibrium outcomes through strategic information transmission.

132

Publications

16.4K

Citations

209

Authors

146

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

27

Authors

209

  1. FF
    Françoise Forges

    Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, France

    5 publications · 610 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. DB
    Dirk Bergemann

    Yale University, United States

    4 publications · 578 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. FS
    Francesco Squintani

    University of Warwick, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 147 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JS
    Joel Sobel

    University of California San Diego, United States

    3 publications · 4.5K citations

    3

    h-index

  5. AB
    Andreas Blume

    University of Pittsburgh, United States

    3 publications · 487 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 209

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 16 publications · 319 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 10 publications · 1.3K citations

    10

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    10 publications · 379 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    7 publications · 6.2K citations

    7

    h-index

  5. Theoretical Economics

    TE · 5 publications · 220 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5