Communication Equilibria
Communication Equilibria is a solution concept in game theory within information economics that extends Bayesian Nash equilibrium by allowing players to exchange messages through a communication device, thereby inducing correlated strategies that are stable under unilateral deviations and refine equilibrium outcomes through strategic information transmission.
132
Publications
16.4K
Citations
209
Authors
146
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
27
Parents
132
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1987 · 3.3K citations
Multistage Games with Communication
Roger B. Myerson · Econometrica · 1986 · 608 citations
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris · Journal of Economic Literature · 2019 · 496 citations
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146
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
7 h-index
9 publications
3.8K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
3.8K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
519 citations
University of California San Diego
San Diego, United States
6 h-index
7 publications
775 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
713 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
638 citations

Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
Paris, France
3 h-index
4 publications
169 citations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
370 citations
1–8 of 146
Repository · 16 publications · 319 citations
12
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JET · 10 publications · 1.3K citations
10
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10 publications · 379 citations
10
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7 publications · 6.2K citations
7
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TE · 5 publications · 220 citations
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1–5