Combinatorial Second-price Auctions

Combinatorial Second-Price Auctions is a mechanism in auction theory where multiple interdependent items are allocated simultaneously and winners pay the second-highest bid for their respective winning combinations, distinguished from standard second-price auctions by allowing bidders to express valuations over bundles of items rather than individual items alone.

20

Publications

1.7K

Citations

38

Authors

26

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

38

  1. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    6 publications · 707 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. SS
    Subhash Suri

    University of California, Santa Barbara, United States

    3 publications · 390 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. AR
    Andrew R. Gilpin

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    2 publications · 247 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. DL
    David Levine

    University of California, Santa Barbara, United States

    2 publications · 247 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. WC
    Wolfram Conen

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    2 publications · 198 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 38

Venues

  1. Sadhana

    1 publications · 57 citations

    1

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  2. Journal of Systems and Software

    JSS · 1 publications · 74 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Journal of Cleaner Production

    1 publications · 34 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. 1

    h-index

  5. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

    1 publications · 12 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5