Collusive Signaling

Collusive Signaling is a strategic communication mechanism in auction theory whereby bidders implicitly convey intent to collude through observable bidding behaviors or patterns, distinguishing it from explicit collusion by relying on tacit understanding rather than direct agreement.

17

Publications

1.1K

Citations

31

Authors

26

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

31

  1. AS
    Abhi Shelat

    University of Virginia, United States

    2 publications · 104 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SB
    Sandro Brusco

    Stony Brook University, United States

    1 publications · 131 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. JA
    Juan A. Máñez

    Universitat de València, Spain

    1 publications · 41 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. MP
    Mohsen Parsa Moghaddam

    Tarbiat Modares University, Iran

    1 publications · 47 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. TH
    Thomas H. Noe

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    1 publications · 104 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 31

Venues

  1. Scandinavian Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 89 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. 2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 1 publications · 41 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. 1

    h-index

  5. Review of Financial Studies

    1 publications · 104 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5