Collusive Signaling
Collusive Signaling is a strategic communication mechanism in auction theory whereby bidders implicitly convey intent to collude through observable bidding behaviors or patterns, distinguishing it from explicit collusion by relying on tacit understanding rather than direct agreement.
17
Publications
1.1K
Citations
31
Authors
26
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
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31
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26

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Georgiana, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
104 citations
Northeastern University
Boston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
71 citations

Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
19 citations

University of Hawaii System
Honolulu, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
19 citations

Tarbiat Modares University
Tehran, Iran
1 h-index
3 publications
141 citations
Lexmark (United States)
Lexington, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations

University of Richmond
Richmond, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
63 citations
Universitat de València
Valencia, Spain
1 h-index
1 publications
41 citations
1–8 of 26
2 publications · 89 citations
2
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2 publications · 46 citations
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JEMS · 1 publications · 41 citations
1
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1 publications · 13 citations
1
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1 publications · 104 citations
1
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1–5