Collusion In Sequential Auctions

Collusion in Sequential Auctions is a strategic interaction phenomenon in auction theory where bidders coordinate their bidding behaviors across multiple temporally ordered auctions to artificially suppress competition, thereby distorting equilibrium outcomes and reducing seller revenue relative to non-cooperative settings.

23

Publications

1.4K

Citations

45

Authors

33

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

45

  1. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    2 publications · 283 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. KS
    Katerina Sherstyuk

    University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, United States

    2 publications · 77 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. MA
    Masaki Aoyagi

    The University of Osaka, Japan

    2 publications · 174 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MW
    Marcel Wieting

    Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. GS
    Geza Sapi

    Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 45

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 3 publications · 471 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 77 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 61 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. 2

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  5. Economic Inquiry

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5