Collusion In Sequential Auctions
Collusion in Sequential Auctions is a strategic interaction phenomenon in auction theory where bidders coordinate their bidding behaviors across multiple temporally ordered auctions to artificially suppress competition, thereby distorting equilibrium outcomes and reducing seller revenue relative to non-cooperative settings.
23
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1.4K
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45
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33
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2017–2026
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Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo A. Hopenhayn · Journal of Economic Theory · 2003 · 171 citations
Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiagent Systems
Tüomas Sandholm · 1996 · 164 citations
Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions
Masaki Aoyagi · Journal of Economic Theory · 2003 · 160 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +12
Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions
Tüomas Sandholm · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · 2000 · 119 citations
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Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
270 citations
The University of Osaka
Osaka, Japan
2 h-index
2 publications
174 citations
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Düsseldorf, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
35 citations

University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa
Honolulu, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
103 citations
Institute for Social and Economic Research
Colchester, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
14 citations
Resources For The Future
Washington D.C., United States
1 h-index
3 publications
192 citations
University of Idaho
Moscow, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
39 citations

Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
51 citations
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JET · 3 publications · 471 citations
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Repository · 3 publications · 77 citations
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2 publications · 61 citations
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2 publications · 113 citations
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1 publications · 11 citations
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