Coercive Offers

Coercive Offers is a corporate finance construct characterized by a takeover bid structured to pressure target shareholders into accepting unfavorable terms through time constraints, partial tender conditions, or disproportionate financial incentives, thereby undermining their collective bargaining power.

14

Publications

645

Citations

18

Authors

15

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

18

  1. SC
    Sris Chatterjee

    Fordham University, United States

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. US
    Upinder S. Dhillon

    Binghamton University, United States

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. GG
    Gabriel G. Ramı́rez

    Binghamton University, United States

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JM
    John McMillan

    University of Otago, New Zealand

    2 publications · 75 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. AW
    Alan Wertheimer

    University of Vermont, United States

    1 publications · 192 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 18

Venues

  1. Journal of Medical Ethics

    3 publications · 267 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Journal of Financial Economics

    2 publications · 145 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Philosophy &amp Public Affairs

    2 publications · 26 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Global Ethics

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Applied Physics

    1 publications · 67 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5