Coalition Share Rules
Coalition Share Rules is a normative framework within coalition formation theory that prescribes the allocation of payoffs or resources among coalition members based on specified criteria such as contribution, power, or equity, distinguishing it from alternative solution concepts by its focus on distributive justice and stability in cooperative game outcomes.
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Institutions
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2017–2026
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CARTEL STABILITY UNDER AN OPTIMAL SHARING RULE*
Hans‐Peter Weikard · Manchester School · 2009 · 122 citations
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Madrid, Spain
1 h-index
1 publications
14 citations
Lancaster University
Lancaster, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
14 citations
Public Works and Government Services Canada
Gatineau, Canada
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
Creative Commons
Mountain View, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
Wageningen University & Research
Wageningen, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
122 citations
Johnson & Johnson (United States)
New Brunswick, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
American College of Surgeons
Chicago, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
122 citations
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1 publications · 14 citations
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1 publications · 21 citations
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MRE · 1 publications · 54 citations
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1 publications · 122 citations
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1 publications · 12 citations
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