Cartel Deterrence

Cartel Deterrence is a theoretical framework within the field of output restriction enforcement that specifically functions to prevent the formation and operation of cartels by instituting punitive mechanisms and monitoring systems that increase the perceived risks and costs of collusion relative to compliance with competitive market regulations.

111

Publications

4.3K

Citations

117

Authors

103

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Authors

117

  1. GS
    Giancarlo Spagnolo

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    17 publications · 725 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. MB
    Maria Bigoni

    University of Bologna, Italy

    7 publications · 358 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. JE
    Joseph E. Harrington

    Johns Hopkins University, United States

    7 publications · 193 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. SF
    Sven‐Olof Fridolfsson

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden

    7 publications · 358 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. CL
    Chloé Le Coq

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    7 publications · 358 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 117

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 39 publications · 999 citations

    18

    h-index

  2. 9

    h-index

  3. The Antitrust Bulletin

    4 publications · 186 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 4 publications · 133 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 3 publications · 118 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5