Cartel Cheating is a strategic deviation by a member firm within an international cartel from the agreed-upon collusive arrangement, such as price-fixing or output restriction, to gain a competitive advantage while retaining the appearance of compliance, thereby undermining the stability and effectiveness of the cartel.
21
Publications
1.2K
Citations
29
Authors
21
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Variants
Cartel Defection
Publications
21
1–5 of 21
Authors
29
- VY
3
h-index
- MC
3
h-index
- JM
3
h-index
- IG
2
h-index
- CD
2
h-index
1–5 of 29
Institutions
21
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
524 citations
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
96 citations
Lancaster University
Lancaster, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
91 citations
William Carey University
Hattiesburg, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
96 citations
Ross School
East Hampton, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
96 citations
Texas A&M University
College Station, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
176 citations
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2 h-index
2 publications
91 citations
Bond University
Gold Coast, Australia
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
1–8 of 21
Venues
- American Economic Review
3 publications · 311 citations
3
h-index
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 3 publications · 114 citations
3
h-index
- The Journal of Law and Economics
JLE · 2 publications · 287 citations
2
h-index
- Economic Inquiry
1 publications · 67 citations
1
h-index
- Federal Law Review
FLR · 1 publications · 21 citations
1
h-index
1–5