Cartel Breakup is a formal enforcement mechanism within antitrust economics that disrupts collusive agreements among firms by introducing structural or regulatory interventions to dismantle coordinated market behavior.
16
Publications
816
Citations
17
Authors
19
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Publications
16
What Determines Cartel Success?
Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2002 · 123 citations · Full text
1–5 of 16
Authors
17
- MC
4
h-index
- VY
4
h-index
- HG
2
h-index
- KH
2
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- JP
2
h-index
1–5 of 17
Institutions
19
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
647 citations
Ross School
East Hampton, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
219 citations
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
219 citations
William Carey University
Hattiesburg, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
219 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
90 citations
Centre for European Economic Research
Mannheim, Germany
2 h-index
3 publications
48 citations
The University of Queensland
Brisbane, Australia
2 h-index
2 publications
90 citations
Michigan State University
East Lansing, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
90 citations
1–8 of 19
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 4 publications · 284 citations
4
h-index
- Journal of Economics
1 publications · 17 citations
1
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- The Business History Review
1 publications · 25 citations
1
h-index
- Journal of European economic history/The Journal of European economic history
1 publications · 60 citations
1
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- International Journal of the Economics of Business
1 publications · 57 citations
1
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1–5