Capacity Expansion Deterrence

Capacity Expansion Deterrence is a strategic economic mechanism whereby an incumbent firm discourages potential competitors from increasing production capacity by preemptively expanding its own capacity, thereby creating excess supply and reducing market prices to unprofitable levels for entrants.

19

Publications

2.5K

Citations

27

Authors

13

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Variants

Capacity-expansion Deterrence

Authors

27

  1. MB
    Marvin B. Lieberman

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    2 publications · 291 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. GM
    Georg Mosburger

    Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. KK
    Kala Krishna

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. YM
    Yue Maggie Zhou

    University of Michigan, United States

    1 publications · 54 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. SE
    Sendil Ethiraj

    University of Michigan, United States

    1 publications · 54 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 27

Venues

  1. 3

    h-index

  2. The Bell Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 1.4K citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Industrial Economics

    2 publications · 317 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Strategic Management Journal

    SMJ · 2 publications · 101 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. The RAND Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 84 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5