Capacity Expansion Deterrence
Capacity Expansion Deterrence is a strategic economic mechanism whereby an incumbent firm discourages potential competitors from increasing production capacity by preemptively expanding its own capacity, thereby creating excess supply and reducing market prices to unprofitable levels for entrants.
19
Publications
2.5K
Citations
27
Authors
13
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
1
Variants
Capacity-expansion Deterrence
Parents
19
Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing
A. Michael Spence · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1977 · 1.2K citations
Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry
Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos, Paul Klemperer · The Economic Journal · 1985 · 189 citations
Eric Rasmusen · Journal of Industrial Economics · 1988 · 92 citations
1–5 of 19
27
University of California, Los Angeles, United States
2 publications · 291 citations
2
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1–5 of 27
13
London Business School
London, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
54 citations

INSEAD
Fontainebleau, France
1 h-index
1 publications
47 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
54 citations
Vienna University of Economics and Business
Vienna, Austria
1 h-index
2 publications
28 citations
Babson College
Wellesley, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
47 citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
59 citations
Laboratoire d’Economie de Dauphine
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
52 citations
Michigan State University
East Lansing, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
59 citations
1–8 of 13
CJE · 3 publications · 73 citations
3
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2 publications · 1.4K citations
2
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2 publications · 317 citations
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SMJ · 2 publications · 101 citations
2
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2 publications · 84 citations
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1–5