Bid Signaling

Bid Signaling is a strategic communication mechanism in spectrum auctions whereby a bidder conveys private information about its intended bidding behavior or valuation to competitors through observable bid choices, distinguishing it from covert or non-informative bidding by its intentional and interpretative function in influencing rivals’ auction strategies.

10

Publications

337

Citations

17

Authors

13

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

17

  1. PC
    Peter Cramton

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    2 publications · 146 citations

    2

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  2. JA
    Jesse A. Schwartz

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    2 publications · 146 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. PE
    Péter Eső

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    1 publications · 49 citations

    1

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  4. ZL
    Zhen Liu

    Shandong University, China

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

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  5. TM
    Thomas M. Valletti

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 17

Venues

  1. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 144 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Energy

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Economics Letters

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. 1

    h-index

1–5