Bargaining Evolution is a theoretical framework within evolutionary game theory that models the emergence and adaptation of bargaining behaviors through dynamic processes of natural selection, distinguishing itself by integrating strategic interaction, payoff-based replication, and population-level evolutionary mechanisms to explain the stability and transformation of cooperative agreements over time.
59
Publications
3.6K
Citations
118
Authors
88
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
6
Parents
Publications
59
Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game
Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page, Karl Sigmund · Science · 2000 · 825 citations · Full text
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
H. P. Young · Journal of Economic Theory · 1993 · 386 citations
1–5 of 59
Authors
118
- MA
3
h-index
- WB
3
h-index
- LW
3
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- BS
3
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- KM
3
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1–5 of 118
Institutions
88
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, United States
3 h-index
6 publications
2.2K citations
Xidian University
Xi'an, China
3 h-index
6 publications
153 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
91 citations
University College London
London, United Kingdom
3 h-index
3 publications
139 citations
Peking University
Beijing, China
3 h-index
4 publications
109 citations
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria
3 h-index
3 publications
1.1K citations
The University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan
2 h-index
4 publications
151 citations
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
100 citations
1–8 of 88
Venues
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
6 publications · 232 citations
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 4 publications · 544 citations
4
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- Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
4 publications · 80 citations
4
h-index
- Games and Economic Behavior
3 publications · 143 citations
3
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- Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences
2 publications · 237 citations
2
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1–5