Bailout Expectations

Bailout Expectations is a theoretical construct in intergovernmental fiscal relations that denotes the anticipated likelihood by subnational governments of receiving financial assistance from a higher level of government in the event of fiscal distress, distinguishing it from general risk assessments by specifically reflecting strategic moral hazard incentives tied to intergovernmental support commitments.

33

Publications

1.2K

Citations

59

Authors

53

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

11

Authors

59

  1. IS
    Isabel Schnabel

    Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Germany

    4 publications · 244 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. TS
    Thomas Stratmann

    George Mason University, United States

    2 publications · 72 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. FH
    Florian Hett

    Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

    2 publications · 101 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. GT
    Gilberto Turati

    University of Turin, Italy

    2 publications · 87 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RC
    Russell Cooper

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    2 publications · 105 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 59

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 252 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. Journal of money credit and banking

    2 publications · 128 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of International Money and Finance

    2 publications · 60 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Economic Inquiry

    2 publications · 54 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Kyklos

    2 publications · 86 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5