Auction Competition Models

Auction Competition Models is a theoretical framework in game theory that formalizes competitive bidding processes among rational agents in zero-sum environments, distinguishing itself by modeling strategic interactions where one agent’s gain is exactly balanced by others’ losses within auction-mediated resource allocation.

32

Publications

1.8K

Citations

64

Authors

48

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

64

  1. RM
    Roman M. Sheremeta

    Case Western Reserve University, United States

    3 publications · 68 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. BR
    Brian Roberson

    Chapman University, United States

    3 publications · 68 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. DK
    Dan Kovenock

    Chapman University, United States

    3 publications · 68 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. BM
    Benny Moldovanu

    University of Bonn, Germany

    2 publications · 123 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. OS
    Orly Sade

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 64

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 67 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. American Economic Journal Microeconomics

    2 publications · 95 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    2 publications · 62 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. ePrints Soton (University of Southampton)

    Repository · 1 publications · 19 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5