Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory stating that no voting system can simultaneously satisfy unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives when aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences across three or more alternatives.

154

Publications

14.3K

Citations

165

Authors

115

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

14

Authors

165

  1. DG
    Donald G. Saari

    Northwestern University, United States

    4 publications · 183 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. CL
    Christian List

    London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 1.4K citations

    4

    h-index

  3. PC
    Peter C. Fishburn

    AT&T (United States), United States

    3 publications · 251 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JA
    John A. Weymark

    Vanderbilt University, United States

    3 publications · 175 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. ZR
    Zvi Ritz

    University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

    3 publications · 98 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 165

Venues

  1. Social Choice and Welfare

    11 publications · 278 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 10 publications · 3.7K citations

    10

    h-index

  3. Journal of Mathematical Economics

    8 publications · 372 citations

    8

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 132 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. Public Choice

    7 publications · 274 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5