Antitakeover Proposal Voting

Antitakeover Proposal Voting is a shareholder proposal voting mechanism, as a formal governance procedure, that specifically enables shareholders to approve or reject corporate charter or bylaw amendments designed to deter or prevent hostile takeover attempts, thereby distinguishing it from other forms of shareholder voting focused on general governance, executive compensation, or social responsibility issues.

2

Publications

1.7K

Citations

5

Authors

3

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

5

  1. NS
    Nilanjan Sen

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    1 publications · 87 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. RC
    Ronald C. Lease

    Purdue University West Lafayette, United States

    1 publications · 1.6K citations

    1

    h-index

  3. JA
    James A. Brickley

    University of Rochester, United States

    1 publications · 1.6K citations

    1

    h-index

  4. CW
    Clifford W. Smith

    University of Rochester, United States

    1 publications · 1.6K citations

    1

    h-index

  5. VB
    Victoria B. McWilliams

    Villanova University, United States

    1 publications · 87 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 5

Institutions

3

  1. Arizona State University

    Tempe, United States

    1 h-index

    2 publications

    174 citations

  2. Tulane University

    New Orleans, United States

    1 h-index

    3 publications

    4.9K citations

  3. University of Rochester

    Rochester, United States

    1 h-index

    3 publications

    4.9K citations

1–3 of 3

Venues

  1. Journal of Financial Economics

    1 publications · 1.6K citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

    JFQA · 1 publications · 87 citations

    1

    h-index

1–2