Agent Discretion

Agent Discretion is a theoretical construct within agency theory that denotes the authority granted to an agent to make autonomous decisions on behalf of an undisclosed principal in the absence of explicit instructions, distinguishing it from mere instrumental compliance by incorporating judgment and initiative.

38

Publications

2K

Citations

64

Authors

51

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Authors

64

  1. PH
    Paul Hurley

    Claremont McKenna College, United States

    2 publications · 57 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MA
    Mark A. Pollack

    Temple University, United States

    2 publications · 76 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. ST
    Stefan T. Trautmann

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    2 publications · 114 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. LS
    Lan Shi

    University of Washington, United States

    1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. JA
    Jeffery A. Jenkins

    University of Virginia, United States

    1 publications · 65 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 64

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 122 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. The Journal of Law and Economics

    JLE · 1 publications · 85 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Review of International Political Economy

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Banking & Finance

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5