Agency Conflicts
Agency Conflicts is a theoretical construct in organizational economics referring to the divergences between the interests of principals and agents arising when agents make decisions that prioritize their own welfare over the objectives delegated by principals.
1.1K
Publications
252.3K
Citations
1.9K
Authors
873
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
174
Variants
Agency Problems
Parents
1.1K
Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Eugene F. Fama · Journal of Political Economy · 1980 · 10.6K citations
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt · Academy of Management Review · 1989 · 9.4K citations
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873

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
19 h-index
32 publications
13.6K citations
European Corporate Governance Institute
Brussels, Belgium
19 h-index
27 publications
8.5K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
16 h-index
19 publications
6.8K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
16 h-index
26 publications
2.4K citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
15 h-index
20 publications
1.5K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
15 h-index
18 publications
7.8K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
14 h-index
20 publications
8.8K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
14 h-index
16 publications
11K citations
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Repository · 112 publications · 11.3K citations
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AMJ · 19 publications · 3.5K citations
19
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ASQ · 14 publications · 2.4K citations
14
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16 publications · 2K citations
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13 publications · 76.5K citations
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