Agency Conflicts

Agency Conflicts is a theoretical construct in organizational economics referring to the divergences between the interests of principals and agents arising when agents make decisions that prioritize their own welfare over the objectives delegated by principals.

1.1K

Publications

252.3K

Citations

1.9K

Authors

873

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

174

Authors

1.9K

  1. LR
    Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía

    Arizona State University, United States

    8 publications · 1.3K citations

    8

    h-index

  2. PJ
    Pornsit Jiraporn

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    8 publications · 457 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    7 publications · 592 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. BN
    Boris Nikolov

    Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland

    7 publications · 989 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. EM
    Erwan Morellec

    Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland

    6 publications · 741 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5 of 1.9K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 112 publications · 11.3K citations

    38

    h-index

  2. Academy of Management Journal

    AMJ · 19 publications · 3.5K citations

    19

    h-index

  3. Administrative Science Quarterly

    ASQ · 14 publications · 2.4K citations

    14

    h-index

  4. The RAND Journal of Economics

    16 publications · 2K citations

    14

    h-index

  5. Journal of Financial Economics

    13 publications · 76.5K citations

    13

    h-index

1–5