Administrative Capture

Administrative Capture is a form of regulatory distortion in which a government agency, tasked with acting in the public interest, becomes dominated by the industries or special interests it is charged with regulating, thereby prioritizing those interests over equitable policy enforcement.

12

Publications

569

Citations

17

Authors

12

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

17

  1. FH
    Fabian Hattke

    Universität Hamburg, Germany

    1 publications · 12 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. JE
    James E. Anderson

    Ford Motor Company (United States), United States

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. EY
    Evgeny Yakovlev

    New Economic School, Russia

    1 publications · 20 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. YG
    Yong Guo

    Tsinghua University, China

    1 publications · 41 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. WW
    Wendy Wagner

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    1 publications · 124 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 17

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

    JPART · 1 publications · 12 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. eYLS (Yale Law School)

    Repository · 1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Review of Policy Research

    RPR · 1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Administration & Society

    AAS · 1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5