Administrative Capture
Administrative Capture is a form of regulatory distortion in which a government agency, tasked with acting in the public interest, becomes dominated by the industries or special interests it is charged with regulating, thereby prioritizing those interests over equitable policy enforcement.
12
Publications
569
Citations
17
Authors
12
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Parents
12
Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983
Thomas W. Merrill · Chicago-Kent law review · 1997 · 34 citations · Full text
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Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
2 h-index
5 publications
533 citations
The Ohio State University
Columbus, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
Clarkson College
Omaha, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
Tsinghua University
Beijing, China
1 h-index
2 publications
82 citations
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Rockville, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
11 citations
Universität Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
12 citations

Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing, China
1 h-index
2 publications
82 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
34 citations
1–8 of 12
Repository · 2 publications · 51 citations
2
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JPART · 1 publications · 12 citations
1
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Repository · 1 publications · 16 citations
1
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RPR · 1 publications · 11 citations
1
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AAS · 1 publications · 11 citations
1
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1–5