Abstract Cultural, structural and bureaucratic barriers between the Department of State and the Department of Defense prevented effective integration, particularly in the postwar planning phase of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. In contrast, the postwar planning in Kosovo, under the PDD 56 interagency coordination process, could have served as a useful template for the political-military planning process to produce a unified political-military plan. Unfortunately, the corporate knowledge contained in PDD 56 did not seem to transfer between administrations. Iraq demonstrated that partial State-Defense integration, which occurred primarily at the highest levels, was insufficient for an undertaking of this magnitude. Many challenges still exist to integrate two diverse executive departments. Keywords: IraqStateDefense Acknowledgement Special thanks to Col. Tom Ehrhard, PhD, who encouraged this research and motivated many Air Force strategists with his teaching. Notes This article is based upon a more extensive thesis. Donald R. Drechsler, “Integrating Military and Diplomatic Power: Kosovo and Iraq” (Master's Thesis, School for Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2004). James Dobbins, Ambassador and Special Envoy for Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Afghanistan, interviewed by author, 5 April 2004. Rowan Scarborough, ‘Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions’, The Washington Times, 6 Dec. 1999, available at < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/991206-pdd.htm > . PDD 56 White Paper, ‘The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive May 1997’ available at < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm > . Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster 2004) p.73. The quote is from a discussion between CIA Director Tenet and President Bush concerning the agency's objection to a bifurcated policy of moving toward war while continuing diplomacy through the UN. Iraq and Kosovo differed dramatically in size, with Iraq using over 200,000 troops at the time of the invasion. The population of Iraq is over ten times that of Kosovo and the size of Iraq dwarfs Kosovo. The purposes of the two wars were quite different. Kosovo was fought to compel the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to stop killing Kosovars. Iraq, in contrast, was fought to topple a corrupt regime that threatened neighbor nations and posed a threat to US national security. The wars also differed sufficiently on the coalitions fighting the war. In Kosovo, the US led the effort with significant NATO involvement. The UN only came on board late into the conflict as the Kosovo war neared its June 1999 settlement. The war in Iraq was primarily a US-led effort with little involvement from the UN or NATO, but it had some contributions from the UK, Australia and Spain. Post Saddam Iraq (U). (Washington, DC: Department of State, Dec. 2000). Information extracted is unclassified. Accessed on 12 Feb. 2004. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.37. The 1998 OPLAN 1003 did not receive final approval from the SECDEF. Ibid. p.30. Ibid. Ibid. p.77. Ibid. p.62. Ibid. pp.61–2. Ibid. p.62. President George W. Bush, as quoted in Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 4) p.64. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.100. This was the 7 Feb. 2002 meeting of the NSC. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.100–102. Phase IV planning is normally an effort by both the State and Defense departments. In most cases in the past decade, the State Department has played the lead role in the post-conflict planning effort. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.30–144. The NSC Principals Committee (PC) consists of the national security advisor, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CIA Director, and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. The NSC Deputies Committee (DC) consists of the deputies for each of the NSC Principals. For a detailed description of the Principals and Deputies Committee, see Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning (Washington, DC: CSIS Press 1998) pp.155–6. Col. John Agoglia, CENTCOM J-5 Deputy Chief of Plans and Chief of the Long Range Planning Element, interviewed by the author, 11 May 2004. See also Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, DC: Regenery Publishing 2004) p.182. For example, the membership of the Economic and Infrastructure Working Group involved professionals from the US, Britain, Canada, Europe, the Middle East and Iraqi Kurdistan. Participants were from many different ethnic and religious groups: Sunnis, Shi'as, Assyrians, Kurds and others. See < http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/dutyiraq/ > for more information. ‘The Future of Iraq Project’, 12 May 2003, report is very lengthy and completely fills an entire CD-ROM. Copies of the ‘Future of Iraq Project’ may be obtained from the Near East Asia Bureau within the State Department or from the State Department Library. James Fallows, ‘Blind into Baghdad’, The Atlantic Monthly 293/1 (Jan.–Feb. 2003) p.56. Ibid. pp.52–72. Eli J. Lake, ‘US plans for post-Saddam Iraqi Government’, The Washington Times, 5 June 2002. Fallows (note 22) p.56. ‘Truth, War, & Consequences’, public television's Frontline, interview with Kanan Makiya conducted on 27 July 2003. The interview is available at < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/makiya.html > (accessed 24 March 2004). The author has read the ‘Future of Iraq Project’ report at great length. There are many interesting and promising ideas contained in the report, but the report looks more like an extensive research project than an actionable plan. Other individuals who had read the report and the author interviewed at State, OSD, OHRA, NDU and CENTCOM had the same opinion. The report is 13 volumes and barely fits on one CD-ROM. As James Fallows notes in his Atlantic Monthly article, ‘Blind into Baghdad’, the FOI Project produced thousands of pages of findings, with hundreds of pages in Arabic. It contains vast amounts of information, but wading through the material is arduous and very little is specific or immediately actionable. During my interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, he noted that he had received the executive overview brief from Tom Warrick. Appreciating the information, Garner added Warrick to the ORHA team. But, when Warrick was removed from the team, he took the FOI Project with him – he did not leave it for ORHA to use! Col. Agoglia interview (note 19). The lack of an actionable plan from the State Department, coupled with the enormity of the FOI report, seemed to deter military planners within the Defense Department from using the FOI report. See Chap. 2 of this thesis for more information about the cultural differences that would cause the State and Defense departments to view the issue of postwar planning very differently. Dr Greg Suchan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, State Department, interviewed by the author, 5 Nov. 2003. The author conducted over a dozen interviews with mid-level and senior-level State Department personnel mostly at the director and deputy assistant secretary level from Nov. 2003 through April 2004. Includes interviews with Dr Greg Suchan, Col. Charles Wilson (Senior Military Representative to State Department) and several officers within the Near East Asia Bureau of the State Department. Suchan interview (note 29). Abram Shulsky, adviser to Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Luti, and Director of Office of Special Plans, interviewed by the author, 6 Feb. 2004. ‘Fact Sheet: Planning for Postwar Iraq’, OSD Policy Office, Office of Special Plans, 17 Nov. 2003. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.145–8. Ibid. p.148. Ibid. p.151. Ibid. pp.152–3. Ibid. pp.148–79. ‘Fact Sheet: Planning for Postwar Iraq’ (note 33). Suchan interview (note 29). Col. Charles Wilson, Political Military Bureau, International Security Office (PM/ISO), interviewed by the author, 5 Nov. 2003. Suchan interview (note 29). ‘Fact Sheet: Planning for Postwar Iraq’ (note 33). Wilson interview (note 41). The PMAT is a 24-hour-a-day operation staffed by State Department employees, established on 12 Sept. 2001 to facilitate actions in the global war against terror. Most of these messages were classified SECRET due to the potential sensitive nature of involvement by some countries. The State Department and CENTCOM maintained a coordinated list of offers and requirements coordinated through the JIACG. Andrew Goodman, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, interviewed by the author, 6 Nov. 2003. The growing number of coalition country offices led to the construction of a multinational trailer park behind CENTCOM headquarters. Many countries made offers, but were in need of new uniforms, equipment and funding, or their equipment simply was not compatible with US equipment. To ensure interoperability, the State and Defense departments worked closely on military aid packages to various countries, which volunteered forces. Goodman interview (note 47). Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster 2002) pp.331–49. Richard Holbrooke, ‘Holbrooke Says U.S. Must Prepare for Long Stay in Iraq; Calls on Bush to Make Major Effort to Repair Ties with France’, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2003, available at < http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id = 5871 > (accessed 30 Jan. 2004). Woodward, Bush at War (note 51) p.349. The headline ‘Cheney Says Peril of Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack’ appeared in The New York Times on 27 Aug. 2002. The harsh and unforgiving tone of Vice President Cheney's speech led many to believe his speech represented administration policy. The threats certainly did not go unnoticed in Iraq. The UNSCR cited ten resolutions concerning Saddam's lack of compliance, to include UNSCRs 661, 678, 686, 687, 707, 715, 986, 1284, 1382. The full text of UNSCR 1441 is available at < http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_11_08a.htm > (accessed 13 March 2004). Suchan interview (note 29). Interview with Senior Official at US State Department who requested anonymity. Interview with Senior Official at US State Department who requested anonymity. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.151, 266–7, 315 and 358–9. Also, Goodman interview (note 46). Since international support was important to the stationing of forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the ICWG often recommended that the Department of State, through its military assistance programs, provide some countries with food, clothing and equipment. Both State and Defense departments spearheaded negotiations to establish basing rights for foreign countries in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, plus necessary Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.231. Ibid. pp.231–4. Lt. Col. Randy Brawley, interviewed by the author, 5 April 2004. Brawley was the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Chief for Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in Iraq and was intimately involved in numerous meetings at CENTAF and CENTCOM planning for the war. Also see Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.257. Fact Sheet ‘Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq’ (Washington, DC: State Department, 8 Nov. 2002) available at < http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm > (accessed 3 May 2004). Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.324–5. See also Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004), 45. Scarborough, pp.175–6. CENTCOM's plans show the northern front from Turkey as a critical component of the war plan. Interview with senior State Department official who requested anonymity, North East Asia Bureau, 5 Feb. 2004. Also see Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.324–5. Ilene R. Prusher, ‘Prospects Wane for Turkish Aid on Iraq, but US Presses On’, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 March 2003. Available at < http://csmonitor.com/2003/0317/p11s01-woiq.html > . Interview with senior State Department official who requested anonymity, North East Asia Bureau, 5 Feb. 2004. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) pp.324–5. Wesley Hallman, ‘Access and Overflight Strategic Opportunity, Operational Risks’, (SAASS Thesis, Air University, June 2004). Interview with senior State Department official who requested anonymity, North East Asia Bureau, 5 Feb. 2004. Also see Gerry J. Gilmore, ‘U.S., Turkey Announce Operation Iraqi Freedom Support Agreement’, American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC, 2 April 2003. Available from < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/n04022003_200304026.html > . Adam J. Herbert, ‘Aerospace World Special: Gulf War II – The Road to Victory’, Air Force Magazine, May 2003, pp.10–16. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.346. Saddam Hussein's thinking had many parallels to Slobodan Milosevic's thinking on the eve of Operation ‘Allied Force’. Both leaders thought the US would either back down, the coalition would fracture or the strike would be minor and short in duration, easily endured. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.349. Herbert, ‘Aerospace World Special’ (note 72) pp.10–16. The inability to compel Turkey to allow US troops to open a northern front in Iraq caused significant changes in the war plan. After weeks of sitting on ships in the Mediterranean, the Turkish parliament's refusal for basing caused the 4th ID to be routed through the Suez Canal, around the Arabian Peninsula and into Kuwait. This long journey delayed the 4th ID's entry into the war until well after the war had begun. The revised war plan involved airdropping the entire173rd Airborne Brigade using 15 C-17s into northern Iraq to support the Kurds and to open a second front to surround Saddam's forces and prevent their escape, while ensuring the Kurds did not advance too far south taking areas north of Baghdad. Despite the diplomatic failure with Turkey, the war plan was adjusted, at the cost of some flexibility and certainly increased use of airlift. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.356. For additional information on Scuds, see < http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/r-11.htm > . For a detailed discussion of the Scud hunt, see Igor J.P. Gardner, Theater Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense: Guarding the Back Door (Maxwell AFB, AL: SAASS Thesis, 1999). Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War (New York: Little, Brown and Company 1995) pp.229–31. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.356. The interagency groups also considered several other humanitarian relief efforts, which did not come to fruition: WMD attacks and decontamination; disrupted food distribution; and the potential disaster from dams being blown up along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. William Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2003) pp.88–233. James Dobbins et al., America's Role in National-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2003) p.169. Condoleezza Rice as quote in Bob Woodward's Bush at War (note 51) p.350. The assumption by OSD Planners was that the US troops would be welcomed as liberators. This assumption is key determinant in the number of troops and resources necessary for postwar Iraq. Scarborough, 46. (note 64) Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony before a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee Subject: ‘Sustaining Global Commitments, Implications for U.S. Forces’, 5 Nov. 2003 (Washington, DC: Federal News Service, Inc. 2004). Also available at < www.defnews.com > . Ibid. Scarborough, p.44. (note 64) Post Saddam Iraq (U) (note 7). Information extracted is unclassified. The State Department had been ‘planning’ for postwar Iraq since Oct. 2001. CENTCOM began a postwar framework in Feb. 2002 and then picked up planning for Phase IV Stability and Reconstruction in Aug. 2002. OSD and the NSC worked on various postwar plans beginning in July–Dec. 2002. Many plans or ideas existed, but they were not coordinated. Col. John Agoglia, CENTCOM J-5 Deputy Chief of Plans and Chief of the Long Range Planning Element from Aug 2001 through Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ interview (note 19). In early 2002, CENTCOM was told that State Department had the lead for Phase IV. About the only work CENTCOM did in the spring of 2002 was to identify the three sub-phases of Phase IV (a, b and c) as a general framework. Mark Sweberg, Chief, Peacekeeping Contingency Planning Branch, State Department, interviewed by the author, 6 Nov. 2003. Tom Warrick and other members of the Near East Asia Bureau had responsibility for the ‘Future of Iraq’ Project. Suchan interview (note 29). Scarborough, 46. (note 64) Wilson (note 41) and Agoglia (note 19) interviews. Wilson interview (note 41). Why would State not be involved at the CENTCOM level? There are only a few potential answers: 1. State was not welcome in a ‘military’ planning process; 2. State didn't see the need to be involved; 3. State didn't have extra personnel, properly trained, available to work with CENTCOM. Agoglia interview (note 19). Col. Wilson and many of those that I interviewed also conveyed some of the same ideas from the State Department perspective. Exactly why some animosity existed between the two departments is unclear, but it is clear that it existed and hindered integration and planning. CENTCOM's plan would be brought to the Pentagon (OSD/JS) for review/refinement. The CWG would meet and feed into the IMPC that would feed into the ESG then to the Deputies Committee. This process was not perfect and lacked lower-level integration before being discussed at the upper levels of the interagency process – improvements to interagency can and should be made. One potential solution is to have something similar to ‘Joint’ military officers; perhaps we need to have ‘Interagency’ officers. Of course, that may take a legislative mandate like Goldwater-Nichols did in the past. Agoglia interview (note 19). Agoglia interview (note 19). Lt. Col. Tom Reilly, Planner on the Combined Forces Land Component Commander's Staff in Kuwait, interviewed by the author, 30 April 2004. Agoglia (note 19), Reilly (note 103) and Major Bryan Sparling, Lead Planner for Phase IV Operations, Combined Land Forces Component Commander's staff, interviewed by author, 30 April 2004. All three officers at different levels of planning indicated the same problems with CJTF-4. The major problem was that like ORHA, CJTF-4 was formed too late and was not a Standing Joint Task Force that had already worked together. CJTF-4 was composed of an ad hoc team that was to communicate back to JFCOM for support. This communication and command and control architecture did not work as planned. Agoglia (note 19) and Sparling (note 104) interviews. Col. Wilson at the State Department also commented that Phase IV planning occurring at the CFLCC would not have had any State Department representation. The State Department is designed to work with OSD and the Joint Staff. The only State Department representation at CENTCOM is the POLAD advising the Combatant Commander. No one from the State Department works at the CFLCC level. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.283. Also found in Scarborough, 176. ORHA was originally called the Office of Postwar Planning. (note 64) Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.282. Ibid. p.282. Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, Director of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq, interviewed by the author, 14 April 2004, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.283. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Nation Building 101’, The Atlantic Monthly 293/1 (Jan.–Feb. 2003) pp.159–62. Garner created ORHA from scratch, staffed from over a dozen offices of the US government, coalition partners and from the private sector. ORHA managed the distribution of humanitarian assistance and began the process of building the new Iraq both physically and politically. Fukuyama (note 111) p.160. Garner interview (note 109). Professor Eric Kjonnerod, National Defense University, and organizer of ORHA meeting at NDU, interviewed by the author, 19 April 2004. Sparling (note 104), Reilly (note 103) and Agoglia (note 19) interviews. Agoglia interview (note 19). This same idea is also expressed in Scarborough, 182. (note 64) CENTCOM's Phase IV plans show that ORHA worked for the CFLCC for Phase IVa, Stabilization, which was to last approximately 120 days. After that ORHA would take the lead for 18–24 months of Reformation, called Phase IVb. Phase IVc would then Transition to full Iraqi control. Military officer serving in the Political-Military bureau who requested anonymity, interviewed by author, 28 April 2004. Garner interview (note 109). Reilly interview (note 103). Ibid. Sparling interview (note 104). Ibid. Ibid. Sparling (note 104), Reilly (note 103) and Agoglia (note 19) interviews. Scarborough, 48. (Note 64). ‘Truth, War, & Consequence,’ Public Television's Frontline, interview with Lt Gen Jay Garner conducted on 17 July 2003. The interview is available on-line at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html. Downloaded 24 March 2004. Garner, PBS Frontline Interview. Fallows (note 22) pp.53–74. Even after the president gave postwar planning authority to Defense as the lead agency in Jan. 2003, efforts between Defense and State were not completely unified. Compared to other departments Defense had more resources, people and money, but even so, Defense did not have the institutional knowledge or capacity alone to do many of the things that needed to be done in reconstruction. Scarborough, 54 and 178. (Note 64). Richard Armitage as quoted in Woodward, Plan of Attack (note 5) p.414.

Donald R Drechsler

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