Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces

TLDR

Modern cars are highly computerized and have been shown to have insecure internal networks, yet the possibility of remote compromise remains an open question. This study systematically analyzes the external attack surface of a modern automobile to determine its susceptibility to remote exploitation. The authors performed a comprehensive assessment of external interfaces—including mechanical tools, CD players, Bluetooth, and cellular radio—to evaluate potential attack vectors. They found that remote exploitation is feasible through a wide range of vectors such as mechanical tools, CD players, Bluetooth, and cellular radio, enabling long‑distance vehicle control, location tracking, in‑cabin audio exfiltration, and theft, and highlighted the ecosystem’s structural weaknesses and mitigation challenges.

Abstract

Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized, and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However, while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure, the associated threat model--requiring prior physical access--has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus, it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors (including mechanics tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio), and further, that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally, we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them.