The Co-Originality of Constituent Power and Representation

Abstract

Rather than looking at empirical instances of representation, this paper intends to investigate the core conceptual structure of representation: the relation between the represented (the people or the ‘constituent power’) and the way they are represented by their representatives. Classical accounts of representation commonly assume that ‘the people’ precede their representation. Representatives either strictly follow the will of the people (the delegate view) or guide the people to their presumed interests (the trustee view). What both views share, is the claim that ‘the people’ somehow exist prior to being represented. We intend to complicate this picture by making use of recent insights concerning the role of representation in the coming about of ‘the people’. Authors such as Michael Saward, Frank Ankersmit and Claude Lefort emphasize the fact that ‘the people’ only come into existence thanks to mechanisms of representation. In a way, representatives call into being the represented. It is because they establish a ‘name’ or a common denominator that a group first comes to recognize itself as a group and, accordingly, can exercise its collective power. Although representatives can be said to ‘create’ the people, representatives cannot simply do so at will and never fully ‘control’ the meaning attributed to this denominator. The represented can always reject the image that is being established. They can refuse to adopt it as an adequate depiction of their collectivity or they can prefer another, competing representation. At the same time, it would be a mistake to ascribe complete freedom to the represented. For they always depend – explicitly or implicitly – on representations of themselves as a collectivity if they want to criticize new or different ways in which they are being represented. What we are ultimately aiming at, then, is the extent to which democratic constituent power – the people – does not exist prior to its representation and, inversely, the extent to which representations depend on – always need to be supported by – constituent power. Identifying and conceptualizing this circular movement between constituent power and representation enables us to put into question the somewhat naive claims by those who believe constituent power can be generated and maintained without the detour of representative mechanisms. At the same time, focusing on this relation of mutual dependence prevents us from falling into a formalist account that would overlook the role of constituent power and take representation to be a mere matter of institutionalized procedures.