University of Pennsylvania Law Review · 1994 · 62 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesCriminal LawPhilosophyCrimeNegligencePhilosophy Of ActionMoral ResponsibilityNormative EthicsSpeech ActsActs Of The DefendantNegligent OmissionOmission DistinctionResponsibility For Omissions
In this Article I examine the way in which Michael Moore in Act and Crime' distinguishes between action and omission, and his reasons for thinking that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. In Part I, I begin by summarizing points of his argument, including his description of views alternative to his own. I then describe my basic points of agreement and disagreement with Moore in Part II. Finally, in Part III I elaborate on some finer contentious points and on positions we both share. My discussion focuses on the first three chapters of Moore's book since these chapters discuss issues relevant to my concerns.2