Herder’s Philosophy of Language, Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles

Abstract

A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE that Herder is founder not only of modern philosophy of language but also of modern philosophy of interpretation (hermeneutics) and translation and that he has many things to say on these subjects from which we may still learn today. (1) This essay will not attempt to make such case, but it will be concerned with some aspects of Herder's position that would be central to it: three fundamental principles in his philosophy of language which also play fundamental roles in his theory of interpretation and translation. The essay's aim is also threefold: first, to describe principles in question and their roles in this theory; second, to explain their emergence in way which helps to make clearer nature of Herder's contribution (for example, I shall be making case for Herder's priority over Hamann and for his indebtedness instead to some less familiar influences); and third, to give at least sense of their philosophical subtlety and defensibility. (A companion essay to follow will discuss Herder's views concerning some prima facie problem cases. (2)) As is well known, model of thought, meaning, and language which predominated during Enlightenment, saliently among British empiricists for example, conceived of thought and meaning in sharply dualistic fashion as (at least in principle) separable and autonomous from whatever material, perceptible expressions they may happen to receive in language, and of language as merely means to their communication which is quite inessential to their actual existence. Herder's first two fundamental principles in philosophy of language contradict this model. The first of these principles asserts that thought is essentially dependent on and bounded by language--that is, that one cannot think unless one has language and one can only think what one can express linguistically. This principle carries important consequences for interpretation. For example, in certain and important sense it guarantees that person's use of language is reliable indicator of nature of his thought (that nature of his thought cannot radically transcend or be discrepant with his use of language). (3) It is well enough known that Herder commits himself to version of this principle in later works such as A Metacritique on Critique of Pure Reason (1799) (henceforth, Metacritique) and Ideas for Philosophy of History of Humanity (1784-91) (henceforth, Ideas). For example, he writes in latter work that a people has no idea for which it has no word. (4) However, it is important to realize that he was already firmly committed to it much earlier. Thus, moving backward chronologically, versions of it are already to be found in On Cognition and Sensation of Human Soul (1778) (henceforth, On Cognition), (5) and in Treatise on Origin of Language (1772) (henceforth, On Origin). (6) But even before that, it is already prominent in Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-68) (henceforth, Fragments), where Herder writes, for example, that language is the form of cognition, not merely in which but also in accordance with which thoughts take shape, where in all parts of literature thought sticks [klebt] to expression, and forms itself in accordance with this.... Language sets limits and contour for all human cognition. (7) Indeed, Herder is already committed to version of principle as early as essay On Diligence in Several Learned Languages (1764) (henceforth, On Diligence), where he writes: What exactly is connection between language and mode of thought? Whoever surveys whole scope of language surveys field of thoughts and whoever learns to express himself with exactness precisely thereby gathers for himself treasure of determinate concepts. The first words that we mumble are most important foundation stones of understanding, and our nursemaids are our first teachers of logic. …