The Economics of Mutual-Fund Brokerage: Evidence from the Cross Section of Investment Channels

Susan Kerr Christoffersen, Richard B. Evans, David K. Musto

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2005 · 39 citations · 21 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

Retail investors typically lack investment expertise. The study examines the value added by mutual‑fund brokers for consumers and fund families amid mixed incentives. Investors pay higher fees through unaffiliated brokers, who add more value to redemptions, while captive brokers add more value to inflows; no‑load investors exhibit a disposition effect, and fund families gain from recaptured redemptions but lose inflows to cannibalization.

Abstract

Retail investors often lack investment expertise. Mutual-fund brokers can help, but their incentives are mixed so it is an empirical question what value they add, both for consumers and for fund families. Investors pay more to invest through unaffiliated brokers than captive brokers, and while unaffiliated brokers add more value to redemptions, captive brokers add more value to inflows. No-load investors are less likely to sell their poor-performing funds and more likely to sell their winning funds, consistent with a disposition effect. Fund families benefit from a captive salesforce through recapture of redemptions, but also suffer through cannibalization of inflows.

References

21