Extending the Battlefield

Abstract

General Donn A. Starry made the following comments on the genesis of this March 1981 article and AirLand Battle: ultimate lesson of Active Defense' and the 1976 edition of FM [US Army Field Manual] 100-5 [Operations] is that it is virtua!!y impossible to substantively rewrite doctrine satisfactorily in a matter of three years, e.g., 1973 to 1976. As principal author of the defense and offense chapters of the 1976 book, [I must say that] when it was done, I was not happy with what got written. Corollary is the fact that the 1976 book was not written at Leavenworth. Though he had stacked the staff at Leavenworth to do the writing, General [William EJ DePuy soon realized it would not be possible to think it all through and write anything worthwhile expeditiously. That conviction was the genesis of the now famous [Fort A.P. Hill doctrine writing sessions. Indeed, much of the 1976 book was drafted at Fort Knox.... So AirLand Battle grew out of concept development at Knox as we struggled with Active Defense. For a very long time, AirLand Battle was a briefing-a bunch of slides I used to talk about war... As suggested, it changed-frequently. [It] changed based on comments, observations and questions from audiences ranging from Congressional hearings to lectures at war and staff colleges in this country, in the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France and Israel. When we finally cleared Leavenworth of the disappointed doctrine writers, got [then Lieutenant General] Bill Richardson in office there and [General] Shy Meyer in office as chief of staff, we were ready to write-at Leavenworth-what became the 1982 book... Many people heard the briefing-whatever its name more than once. Most noted it was never quite the same-the second and third times they heard it, it may have included something someone in a past audience had suggested. Soon, many came to believe it made sense; further, they came to believe it was their idea. Armed with those two things, you can change a world. And we did. THE EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD concept primarily deals with war in areas of the world where there are large numbers of relatively modern, well-equipped forces who use Soviet-style operational concepts and tactics. Quite naturally, therefore, the threat against which the concept is designed is typified by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the larger aggregations of mechanized forces in the Middle East or the threat from the north in Korea. The concept emphasizes the all-too-frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history that, once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something, or else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to avert defeat, but, rather, it must be to win. This article does not propose new and radical ways to fight the battle to win. Rather, it describes an extension of the battle and the battlefield which is possible to accomplish now and which, if applied, will reinforce the prospects for winning. The extended battlefield is not a new concept. It is a more descriptive term for indicating the full potential we must realize from our acquisition, targeting and weapons systems. The battlefield and the battle are extended in three ways: First, the battlefield is extended in depth, with engagement of enemy units not yet in contact to disrupt the enemy timetable, complicate command and control and frustrate his plans, thus weakening his grasp on the initiative. Second, the battle is extended forward in time to the point that current actions such as attack of follow-on echelons, logistical preparation and maneuver plans are interrelated to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle as time goes on. And, lastly, the range of assets figuring in the battle is extended toward more emphasis on higher level Army and sister service acquisition means and attack resources. …