Securing the promise of nanotechnologies: towards transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Report

Linda K. Breggin, Robert Falkner, Nico Jaspers, John Pendergrass, Read Porter

London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · 2009 · 33 citations · 17 references

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Abstract

Addressing global dimensionsNo efforts have been undertaken as yet to create a formal, treaty-based, international framework for nanomaterials regulation.Our research suggests little if any interest in pursuing the more ambitious objective of creating an international treaty on nanomaterials regulation.The political energies that would need to be invested in such a project are better spent on strengthening existing forums for international coordination and adjusting domestic regulatory frameworks where needed.Given the globalized nature of nanotechnological developments and commercialization, however, one cannot rule out the possibility that such a need for an international framework treaty might arise in the future, particularly as new players from the developing world are emerging in the global nanotechnology business.In view of the ongoing and accelerating globalization of nanotechnologies, the EU and the US should perceive the global governance challenges arising from nanomaterials in broader terms.The OECD serves an important function as a forum for coordination among leading industrialized countries, but its work should be complemented by the development of international governance capacity in other areas, and there should be greater inclusion of developing countries.Other international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), play important roles in their respective areas of global environmental protection and health promotion, but are only just beginning to identify the EHS risks of nanomaterials as emerging areas of concern.The current imbalance in the development of international governance capacity should thus be redressed, not least to ensure that developing countries are better represented in global regulatory cooperation. xiv Securing the Promise of Nanotechnologies Comparative analysis: chemicals regulationThe key legal instruments for regulating chemicals in the US and EU are, respectively, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (together with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which addresses pesticides) and the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (together with the Regulation on Classification, Labelling and Packaging -CLP).This report focuses on the laws and regulations that apply to a range of industrial chemicals, as opposed to those specifically for pesticides, because TSCA and REACH are likely to govern a wider range of nanomaterials.Any comparison between the two regulatory systems must recognize that there is a long track record of TSCA implementation that allows for a more thorough assessment of how that system works in practice, while such an evaluation is not yet possible with respect to the recently enacted REACH.Furthermore, although a track record exists under TSCA for regulating conventional chemicals, until recently there was only minimal information available to the public about regulatory actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US regarding nanomaterials, and that information is still limited because of claims of confidential business information..Moreover, numerous factors will influence the degree to which the approaches converge over time.Neither regulatory system is completely independent.Multinational companies that operate in both the EU and US are subject to both regulatory systems and may choose to take similar approaches to the manufacture, use and distribution of their chemicals that contain nanomaterials.In addition, because EU importers are subject to REACH requirements, in some cases they may rely on their suppliers, including US exporters, to provide hazard data and safe use information required for registration.Furthermore, data generated or reported by companies under one system may be factored into regulatory requirements and decisions under the other.Finally, the extent to which regulators coordinate and share information on an informal and formal basis will influence the likelihood of similar regulatory decisions, despite differences in regulatory policies and authorities.Pre-manufacture review and registration requirements.TSCA and REACH are similar in that they require companies to determine prior to manufacture whether a chemical is subject to regulatory requirements.Both US and EU regulators consider their authorities under TSCA and REACH broad enough to cover nanomaterials, although both regulatory schemes provide for exemptions and the standards and processes that govern whether a particular nanoscale chemical will be subject to government requirements differ considerably.A principal difference is that REACH eliminates the distinction between new and existing chemicals, in an effort to subject all chemicals to the same regulatory oversight, though it delineates between non-phase-in (new) and phase-in chemicals (existing) for purposes of registration time frames and in some cases data requirements.As a result, under REACH eventually all chemicals that fall within its jurisdiction will be subject to registration requirements.In most cases, chemicals may be manufactured shortly after registration materials are submitted regardless of whether regulators have conducted a dossier or substance evaluation.In contrast, TSCA distinguishes between new and existing chemicals for purposes of the pre-manufacture obligations imposed on manufacturers and the corresponding regulatory tools available to the EPA.'New' chemicals are automatically subject to pre-manufacture notification and review, enabling the agency to determine whether restrictions should be imposed prior to allowing the chemical to be manufactured.However, the information that companies are required to submit is typically limited in comparison to that required by REACH.The agency also can review a significant new use of an existing chemical, provided it has issued an applicable significant new use rule.Otherwise, a company may manufacture an existing chemical without any prior regulatory review.Information and data-collection requirements.The approaches and authorities granted to regulators to require manufacturers to produce information, including EHS data, differ significantly under the two systems.Nevertheless, in theory both are science-based approaches that seek to assess the risk of chemicals.As a result, US and EU regulators face fundamentally similar challenges in regulating nanomaterials, including limited knowledge of human health and ecotoxicological effects and the need in some cases to adjust or develop test methods.Both TSCA and REACH provide a range of information-gathering authorities and tools.One of the key differences is that manufacturers and others subject to REACH are required to provide certain informationwithout action by a regulator -regardless of whether the information is already available or has to be generated.The scope of the information and data required and the time frame for submission vary considerably, depending on the quantity manufactured and potential toxicity of the chemical.Under TSCA, manufacturers only are required to provide information automatically -without action by a regulator -if a chemical is 'new' and, therefore, subject to pre-manufacture review or if the EPA has issued a 'significant new use' rule that applies to an existing chemical.In both cases, the information that must be submitted is generally information that already exists and is reasonably ascertainable, as opposed to new information generated for the purposes of regulatory review.www.chathamhouse.org.uk xv Finally, both TSCA and REACH protect confidential business information (CBI), but allow for its disclosure when necessary to protect human health or the environment.The systems vary, however, in their treatment of CBI.For example, in contrast to TSCA, REACH allows for the disclosure of CBI to foreign governments pursuant to agreements that provide for appropriate protection of the information.Regulatory controls.TSCA and REACH take differing approaches to regulating the manufacture, use and distribution of chemicals.One of the most notable differences is the REACH prioritization process.Regulators develop a list of substances of very high concern that may be subject to the authorization process under which manufacturers must apply for authorization of each use of a chemical and bear the burden of demonstrating that the risks associated with the use of the substance are adequately controlled or that the socio-economic benefits outweigh the risks.Manufacturers must also analyse whether a safer alternative exists and, if so, must prepare a substitution plan.TSCA does not prioritize chemicals in this manner and does not require manufacturers to perform substitution analyses.Several factors will influence the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU prioritization process, but the authorization process represents a significant departure from the approach taken under TSCA.Another tool under REACH for regulating chemicals is the restriction process, which bears some similarity to the TSCA chemical review and regulatory process.Both require regulators to examine chemicals on a case-bycase basis and determine whether controls are needed, but the substantive and procedural burdens placed on the regulators vary considerably under the respective systems.It is difficult to determine at present how the REACH standards and procedures will work in practice and therefore how it will compare to TSCA' s approach for imposing restrictions on new and existing chemicals; however, in seeking to impose restrictions EU regulators will have substantial information and data available to them as a result of the registration process.Finally, in addition to the authorization and restriction process, REACH requires that manufacturers apply 'appropriate measures to control risks' that they identify in their chemical safety assessments.Althoug

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