Michigan Law Review · 1999 · 19 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceJudicial PoliticsJudicial ReviewNormative JurisprudenceJudicial BehaviorStrategic VotingVoting BehaviorVoting TheoryCollective Decision AuthorityJudicial Behavior TheoryJudicial Voting BehaviorStrategic Behavior Of JudgesStrategic Interaction Among JudgesStrategic Judicial BehaviorStrategic Voting By JudgesVoting Norms
In appellate adjudication, decisions are rendered by a multimember court as a collective entity, not by individual judges. Yet legal scholars have only just begun to explore the formal and informal processes by which individual votes are transformed into a collective judgment.' In particular, they have paid insufficient attention to the ways in which the vote of each individual judge is influenced by the views of her colleagues on a multimember court.