Strategic Communication in Dictatorships: Performance, Patriotism, and Intimidation

Abstract

Research shows that dictators’ public rhetoric shapes both elite and mass opinion and behavior. However, the determinants of dictators’ strategic communication remain undertheorized and underresearched. Theoretically, we argue that (i) dictators primarily use three key communication strategies (“performance” and “patriotism,” which serve to boost legitimacy, and “intimidation,” meant to deter opponents); (ii) they substitute between them depending on the situational context. Empirically, we introduce a novel corpus of post-Soviet leaders’ legislative addresses and then, employing semisupervised text analysis, test our argument. We find that autocrats legitimize themselves as performance-focused leaders during economic upturns, emphasize patriotism during elections, and turn to the rhetoric of intimidation when facing protests and sanctions. We further validate our theory using a global set of authoritarian speeches, in a different language. The findings support but also contest some established assumptions regarding how and when dictators’ communication changes.