Contemporary Accounting Research · 2023 · 63 citations · 79 references
BusinessAccountancyCorporate GovernanceCorporate DisclosureCorporate ReportingCorporate Social ResponsibilityCorporate Responsibility ReportingCorporate Social Responsibility ReportingCorporate Sustainability DisclosureDisclosure TheorySocial ResponsibilitySustainability ReportingCorporate Disclosure QualityCsr DisclosureCsr ReportingCsr SignalingInformation IntermediariesTenure IncentivesTotal Compensation DisclosureTransparency In Corporate Reporting
Abstract The literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure focuses on its economic consequences, but little is known about motivations—especially CEO personal incentives—behind such disclosure. Using an array of CSR reporting measures, we find that career concerns of CEOs early in their tenure motivate them to use voluntary CSR reporting as a signaling mechanism. The negative association between CEO tenure and CSR reporting is more pronounced in firms with stronger information intermediaries—that is, a higher level of socially responsible investors, a higher number of analysts following, and a higher level of media coverage. We also find that CEOs early in their tenure receive more personal benefits after voluntary CSR reporting, in terms of higher total compensation, better reputation, and less turnover, than CEOs later in their tenure. Taken together, the findings of our study lend support to the conjecture that CEO career concerns early in their tenure can be an important determinant of firms' voluntary CSR reporting.
79
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Eugene F. Fama · Journal of Political Economy · 1980 · 10.6K citations
Robert E. Verrecchia · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1983 · 3.5K citations
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Alexander Dyck, Luigi Zingales · The Journal of Finance · 2004 · 2.6K citations · Full text