An Efficient and Provably Secure Identity Authentication Scheme for VANET

Abstract

In recent years, many researchers have applied aggregated signature techniques to resource-constrained vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) authentication scenarios. We reviewed two recent VANET authentication schemes based on certificateless aggregated signatures (CLASs) while demonstrating that neither of them is resistant to public key replacement attacks under their security models. An eavesdropper can successfully forge a legitimate signature to perform malicious operation. To further address the above security flaws, we propose an improved CLAS scheme for VANET. Considering that some researchers have briefly or even incorrectly used forking lemmas in their security proofs to prove an insecure CLAS scheme, we further improve and refine the security model and security proof method for CLAS, which make the proof process transparent by using general forking lemma. Based on these improvements, our scheme can resist attacks from two types of adversaries in the CLAS security model. In the final performance analysis, the improved CLAS scheme outperforms the secure-related scheme of recent years in terms of both computational and communication efficiency. Therefore, our proposal is more suitable for resource-constrained VANET environments.