Analysis of Label-Flip Poisoning Attack on Machine Learning Based Malware Detector

Abstract

With the increase in machine learning (ML) applications in different domains, incentives for deceiving these models have reached more than ever. As data is the core backbone of ML algorithms, attackers shifted their interest towards polluting the training data itself. Data credibility is at even higher risk with the rise of state-of-art research topics like open design principles, federated learning, and crowd-sourcing. Since the machine learning model depends on different stakeholders for obtaining data, there are no existing reliable automated mechanisms to verify the veracity of data from each source.Malware detection is arduous due to its malicious nature with the addition of metamorphic and polymorphic ability in the evolving samples. ML has proven to solve the zero-day malware detection problem, which is unresolved by traditional signature- based approaches. The poisoning of malware training data can allow the malware files to go undetected by the ML-based malware detectors, helping the attackers to fulfill their malicious goals. A feasibility analysis of the data poisoning threat in the malware detection domain is still lacking. Our work will focus on two major sections: training ML-based malware detectors and poisoning the training data using the label-poisoning approach. We will analyze the robustness of different machine learning models against data poisoning with varying volumes of poisoning data.