Review of Accounting Studies · 2022 · 143 citations · 20 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceCorporate FinanceInvestment ManagementSustainable FinanceInstitutional Investor VotingInvestment FundsInvestor EngagementMutual FundsResponsible InvestmentShareholder Proposal VotingFund FamiliesIndex Fund VotingInvestment ObjectivesMutual Fund VotingResponsible InvestingSocial Shareholder ProposalsSocially Responsible Mutual FundsSustainable Investment Funds
Abstract We document that U.S. mutual funds with investment objectives designated as “Sustainable Investment Overall” by Morningstar (ESG funds) are more likely than other mutual funds to vote in support of environmental and social (ES) shareholder proposals and governance (G) shareholder proposals. We also find that the higher support for ES proposals by ESG funds relative to other funds is more pronounced in index funds than in active funds, consistent with trading constraints influencing voting behavior. While these results provide evidence that ESG funds “walk the talk” with their voting behavior on average, we find that fund families play a significant role in that walk. Additionally, in an analysis of fund families that are signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), we find that ESG funds of PRI families are significantly more likely to support ES proposals and G proposals than non-ESG funds of PRI families. We determine that this significant difference stems from non-ESG funds of PRI families providing less support than non-ESG funds from non-PRI families. Taken together, these results provide evidence that ESG funds available to U.S. investors provide more support for shareholder proposals aligned with their designated investment objective, but the type and family of the fund influence that support.
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Passive investors, not passive owners
Ian Appel, Todd A. Gormley, Donald B. Keim · Journal of Financial Economics · 2016 · 936 citations