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Who Cooperates with Whom in Diverse-Gender Teams: Paying to Cross the Gender Gap
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2022
Year
Public Goods GameGender DisparityGender IdentityGender StudiesSociologyCultural DiversityManagementDiverse-gender TeamsEffective TeamworkGender SegregationEducationGender GapIntergroup CooperationGender DivideFeminist TheoryOrganizational BehaviorSocial Sciences
Today, people are likelier than ever to work in gender-diverse teams, yet effective teamwork requires cooperation. In three experimental studies, we investigate the link between one’s gender, the gender of peers, expectations, behaviors, and performance: Do men and women cooperate differently in gender-mixed versus gender-segregated settings? Using a public goods game, we find that diverse-gender teams elicit lower contributions than all-male or all-female teams. In particular, males in diverse teams give much less than females, reciprocate less, and act unfairly. As a result, females in diverse-gender teams fare the worst. Gender segregation is one solution, but we propose another: We offer participants the option of paying for the right of selecting their peers’ gender. When men pay to choose their counterparts, most select women. A costly selection, we find, is indicative of a credible cooperative intent, mitigating the cooperation gender gap. Men who pay are more likely to contribute, reciprocate, and act fairly. We tie the findings to conversations about organizational and entrepreneurial teams.